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The Effect of the New Pennsylvania
Crimes Code on Organized Crime:
Too Little But Not Too Late
David H. Ehrenwerth*
The architects of Pennsylvania's new Crimes Code1 undertook a
monumental task when they attempted to codify and integrate the
criminal laws of Pennsylvania. Regrettably, yet understandably, it was
beyond the scope of the legislature's undertaking to closely consider the
question of whether the substantive crimes-which are basically similar
under both the old and the new codes-are sufficient to control the
2
sophisticated activities in which organized criminal syndicates engage.
Moreover, no thought seems to have been given to the issue of whether
Pennsylvania's criminal laws actually encourage the growth of organized crime and corruption in government by outlawing certain
"amusements and services" which the public continues to demand, and
only those who are willing to violate the law can provide.3 It is the pur* Assistant Attorney General of Pennsylvania assigned as Counsel for the Westzrn
Region of the Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1972-1974. B.A., University of Pittsburgh,
1969; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1972.
The author wishes to thank his students at the University of Pittsburgh Law School,
especially Thomas P. Lutz, for their ideas and assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 101-5201 (1973).
2. The Joint State Government Commission which was responsible for producing the
new Crimes Code, openly acknowledges that "The new code's greatest contribution to
more effective administration of criminal justice is in its classification of crimes and its
re-enactment of existing offenses in clear and modern language." The Commission correctly explained that such a codification was essential because "The Criminal Code of
1860 was not in any sense of the word complete because it did not purport to cover
important areas of criminal law which were still controlled by the ancient and nebulous
common law. Nor did the Penal Code of 1939 materially improve the situation ....
[P]rior to the adoption of the new crimes code, criminal law in Pennsylvania, as in
many other states, lacked comprehensive treatment and systematization." JOINT STATE
GOVERNMENT COMrMISSION, COMMENTS

RELATING TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMES CODE

ii (1973). This being the goal of the draftsmen, many of the changes do little more than
give new names to old crimes. For example, the new Crimes Code creates the crime of
"Theft by Extortion," CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3923 (1973), which is defined in
such a way as to be a codification of several crimes under the old Penal Code which
were titled "Blackmail," Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, § 801; "Blackmail by injury
to reputation or business," id. § 802; "Blackmail by accusation of heinous crime," id. §
803; "Blackmail by threatening murder or destruction of particular property," id. § 804;
"Blackmail by threatening letter or accusation of crimes," id. § 805; and "Blackmail by
threatening to kidnap or damage property generally," id. § 806.
3. For forceful arguments in favor of legalizing most of the "victimless crimes" in
which organized crime engages, see N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINs, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S
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pose of this article to analyze how effectively the new Crimes Code can
be expected to combat the industries of organized crime and to suggest
both new laws and the de-criminalization of certain activities which
might better achieve the goal of eradicating organized criminal
syndicates.
As is the case with legitimate businesses, organized criminal syndicates
can only flourish if they are successful in supplying goods and services
for which the public is willing to pay. 4 The only additional factor
which organized crime must analyze beyond normal business considerations is the risk of law enforcement interference with their activities.
Whenever the risk is small and the potential profits are great, organized crime sets up shop. 5 Therefore, if the legislature chooses to prohibit a certain activity which the public desires, its mandate will only
be obeyed if it provides enforceable laws which make it economically
unfeasible to keep the illegal business in operation. When this is not
the case, organized crime is willing to view the expense and inconvenience caused by ineffective law enforcement efforts as merely constituting "an insignificant cost of business."
ORGANIZED ILLEGAL GAMBLING

No activity of organized crime better demonstrates this phenomenon
than illegal gambling operations. There is virtually universal agreement that gambling is the largest source of revenue for organized crime
both in Pennsylvania and nationwide. 6 The "numbers game" and
betting on sporting events are common pastimes in Pennsylvania. As
the President's Task Force on Organized Crime concluded:
Most large city gambling is established or controlled by organized
crime members through an elaborate hierarchy. Money is filtered
GUIDE To CRIME CONTROL (1970) [hereinafter cited as TmE HONEST POLITICIAN's GUIDE);
N. Morris, Crimes Without Victims: The Law is a Busybody, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 1973,
§ 10 (Magazine), at 10 [hereinafter cited as Crimes Without Victims].
4. The economics of organized crime is presented in Schelling, Economic Analysis and
Organized Crime, in TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, TuE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT].
5. TASK FORCE REPORT,

supra note 4, at 2.

6. Numerous independent studies and Congressional hearings have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4; ORGANIZED CRIME AND OFFICIAL CORRUPTION, REPORT OF THE COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REDUCING CRIME AND AssuR-

ING JuSTIc,

(1972); Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Comm'n--on
Government Operations,Gambling and Organized Crime, S. Rep. No. 1310, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962); KEFAuvER COMM., SECOND INTERIM REPORT, S. Rep. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st

Sess. 11 (1951).
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from the small operator who takes the customer's bet, to persons
who pick up money and slips, to second eschelon figures in charge
of particular districts, and then into one of several main offices.
The profits that eventually acrue to organization leaders moves
through channels so complex that even persons who work in the
betting operation
do not know or cannot prove the identity of
7
their leaders.
Testimony elicited at recent trials of Western Pennsylvania gambling
figures has caused federal authorities to conclude that one gambling
syndicate alone grosses between 20 and 30 million dollars per year in
Allegheny County.8 Projections made from records seized by the Internal Revenue Service reveal that the volume of business conducted
by major numbers banks in Pennsylvania totals over 240 million dollars
per year.9 The money obtained from these operations becomes "seed
money" for the many other more lucrative but higher risk operations
in which organized crime engages, such as loan sharking, narcotics
smuggling, and the infiltration of legitimate business.10 Recognizing
the extent and effects of illegal gambling, law enforcement agencies
on all levels of government have established "anti-gambling" strike
forces which probe and arrest gambling operatives.1
With this background, let us consider what the new Crimes Code
has done to assist law enforcement officials who are attempting to enforce the gambling laws. Under the old Penal Code, anyone convicted
of "operating a lottery"'21 or being a "common gambler"'3 was guilty
of a misdemeanor and could be sentenced to an imprisonment of up to
one year or be sentenced to pay a fine of up to $500. The new Crimes
4
Code makes "operating a lottery" a misdemeanor of the first degree .
An individual who is convicted of this offense can be sentenced to jail
for up to five years and can be fined up to $10,000.15 At the same time,
7. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-3.
8. Interview with Milton J. Carp, Attorney-in-charge, United States Justice Depart.
ment Western Pennsylvania Strike Force on Organized Crime, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, February 21, 1974.
9. PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 26 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME].
10. Id. at 25.
11. In Western Pennsylvania, the City of Pittsburgh Police, the County Detectives,
the Pennsylvania State Police, the United States Attorney's Office and the Federal Strike
Force on Organized Crime and Racketeering all devote a substantial part of their manpower to uncovering and prosecuting gambling law offenders.
12. Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, § 601.
13. Id. § 603.
14. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5512 (1973).
15. Id. §§ 1101, 1103.
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the new Crimes Code makes it perfectly clear that the individual who
actually engages in the gambling-the bettor--cannot be prosecuted
for any offense whatsoever.1 6
One's initial response when comparing these two laws might be to
exclaim that the new Crimes Code has finally given law enforcement
officials a powerful statute with which to fight organized gamblers. The
reality of the situation is quite to the contrary. Because of the
sophisticated manner in which organized gamblers operate, it is extremely difficult to convict the higher officials of the syndicates; only the
federal law enforcement authorities, who have the powerful tool of
wiretapping at their disposal,17 have been successful in doing so.
Pennsylvania law does not permit the use of this technique.' Recognizing this fact, organized gambling syndicates quite naturally conduct
much of their business over the telephone, confident that the law will
prevent state law enforcement authorities from detecting them.
Those low-level numbers writers who are arrested know that the
syndicates will compensate them for their time and expenses and that
they will be back in business within a few days. In order to understand
why gambling czars take such good care of their operatives, let us put
ourselves in the position of a major gambling entrepreneur. His
operation grosses him $75,000 per week. During a period when law
enforcement is rigorous, one or two of his writers would be arrested
every week. Under the old law, he could expect that "covering" his
16. Id. § 5512(c), states, "The purchaser of any ... ticket, or device, shall not be liable
... One must wonder how
to any prosecution or penalty arising out of this crime .....
this is consistent with the apparent goal of the new Crimes Code to be harder on gambling
violators.
17. By Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-20 (1973), Congress authorized court ordered wiretapping and electronc surveillance by federal law enforcement authorities.
18. It is beyond the scope of this article to thoroughly debate the merits of permitting
wiretapping by state authorities. For a detailed analysis of this problem, see Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases, TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 4, at Appendix C. It should be noted, however, that court-authorized surveillance by law enforcement authorities was incorporated into the American Bar Association's
Standards for Criminal Justice "subject to strict limitations which ... should be enforced
through appropriate administrative and judicial processes." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 1.1 (Approved Draft (1971)). In addition, a recent survey conducted by the Na-

tional Association of Attorneys General of 294 local prosecutors in states which did not
authorize electronic surveillance revealed that 83 per cent favor such laws.
Nineteen states currently authorize electronic surveillance; Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washing.

ton and Wisconsin.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEY'S GENERAL, CoMW.ITrEE ON THE
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL' LEGISLATION 30, 34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL LEGISLATION].
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writers' fines would cost him $500 to $1,000 per week. Although the
new Crimes Code theoretically permits the courts to fine these convicted numbers writers up to $10,000 each, judges still seem to view a
$1,000 or $1,500 fine as being very steep,' 9 and it is unlikely that reimbursing two convicted writers would cost our gambling czar more
than $3,000. Such relatively small expenses, which amount to far less
than 5 per cent of the organized gambler's gross receipts, can hardly be
expected to deter a profit-hungry entrepreneur. To be sure, organized
gambling syndicates would find it difficult to operate if their street level
employees were regularly sentenced to long terms in jail. As discussed
above, convicted numbers writers could be awarded prison sentences.
However, experience indicates that judges do not normally imprison
convicted gamblers. For example, of the 774 people convicted for
operating an illegal lottery in Allegheny County in 1970, 95.2 per cent
were fined, 3.4 per cent were placed on probation and only 1 per cent
were sentenced to jail. 20 This sentencing pattern is quite understandable. The defendants in gambling cases are often friendly looking
grandmothers, crippled war veterans, and ghetto residents who plead
to the judge that writing numbers is "the only honest way that they
can make a living."
It is very unlikely that ordering these people to pay large fines
or sentencing them to jail for five years would be either fair or
effective. Even if the judges did award maximum sentences, organized crime's profits are so great that it would not be deterred.
Even $10,000 a week in fines, when compared to $75,000 in gross
receipts, would not be enough to force successful numbers operators out
of business. The few unfortunate writers who are sentenced to jail are
quickly replaced. Consequently, gambling receipts can be expected to
provide a steady source of lucrative profits to the criminal syndicates.
In addition, because much of the public does not consider gambling
to be an "evil crime," many police officers tend to look the other way
when they observe numbers writers; some become employees of the
syndicate and receive generous "protection" payments.2 ' The extent of
the corruption resulting from this type of situation will be discussed in
detail below.
19.. Data supplied by Robert Pierce, Allegheny County Clerk of Courts, indicates that
offenders tried for lottery violations subsequent to the effective date of the Crimes Code
still most often receive fines of less than $1,000.
20. Statistics supplied by Robert Pierce, supra note 19.
21. See, e.g., COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REDUCING CRIME AND ASSURING
JusTICE ch. 6 (1972); J. GARDINER, THE PoLrTcs OF CORUP'TION (1970).
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A major change is needed and there seem to be only two rational
alternatives. One solution is to enact a statute aimed directly at
syndicated gambling operators. The only statute which would have
even a chance at being successful would be one which dealt with the
problems of organized gambling by focusing not on the specific numbers writer but on the sophisticated organizations which control illegal
gambling. The legislature must enact a syndicated gambling statute
which is keyed to the amount of gambling activity being conducted by
the racketeer, the number of individuals involved in his gambling
operation, and the amount of "action" being handled by his enterprise.
Such a statute, patterned after the federal law which has enabled
federal authorities to convict high-level gambling officials in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, 22 has been introduced in the Pennsylvania State
Legislature. 23 The proposed statute would make operating a lottery or
other gambling business a felony and, if used effectively, could go a
long way towards putting major syndicated operators out of business.
The only limitation would be that state authorities, unlike federal
authorities, would be unable to use wiretapping to gather evidence for
use in syndicated gambling prosecutions. If the goal of the state
legislature is to eradicate organized gambling, such a syndicated
gambling statute is a necessity. Otherwise, the many hours of state and
local law enforcement resources which are devoted to the problem of
illegal gambling will achieve little more than the harassment of lowlevel numbers writers and the continued employment of many law
enforcement officials who specialize in gambling investigations.
The second alternative is far more dramatic, but in the long run,
far more realistic: the de-criminalization of gambling activity in Penn-

22. Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970). By redefining what constitutes organized criminal activity, the federal law gives the United States Justice Department a much improved ability to probe gambling and official corruption. Section 1955
states
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of
an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section (1) illegal gambling business means a gambling business
which (i) is a violation of the law of a state or political subdivision in which it is
conducted; (ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise,
direct, or owns all or part of such business; and (iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue
of $2,000 in any single day (2) 'gambling' includes but is not limited to pool selling,
bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.
28. S. Bill No. 120 (1972). This bill was suggested by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission. See PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION, 1971-72 REPORT 18 (1972).
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sylvania. Traditionally, gambling has been viewed as a dangerous vice
because it eats up the welfare checks of our impoverished citizens who
bet again and again, dreaming of the day they strike it rich. 24 Others
contend that a good Christian society should not support such a wasteful and immoral habit that has no social value.2 5 One must wonder how
these arguments can be persuasive now that Pennsylvania has established
its own state lottery. The Bureau of the State Lottery regularly advertises
that betting a dollar can make the purchaser of the lottery ticket an
"instant millionaire," and offers at least three different varieties of lotteries on which Pennsylvania citizens can bet 50 cents or $1.00.26 We
have developed a situation where the comer cigar store owner who
writes numbers is a criminal and his friend who runs a pin-ball establishment and sells state lottery tickets is an agent of the government.
The advent of the state lottery seems to wipe out any moral arguments
against the legalization of gambling. Perhaps the legislature was quietly
acknowledging this fact by providing in the new Crimes Code, that the
27
individual bettors are not guilty of any prosecutable offense.
Some staunch opponents of gambling would quickly respond that
the funds derived from illegal gambling finance the more henious
industries of organized crime, ranging from labor racketeering to loan
sharking. In addition, they would warn that the money generated by
organized gambling is a great corruptor of our elected officials and
police officers. Yet, to state these arguments is to make a very strong
case for the legalization of gambling. If our numbers writers were
engaging in a legitimate business, they would have no need to bribe
policemen; there would be no reason for them to support corruptable
local government officials. Furthermore, if gambling were legalized
and closely controlled and licensed by the state, it would be very unlikely that the revenues derived from it could be invested in more
serious criminal activity. 28 Applicants for a gambling license would be
screened and their mode of operation would be subject to great scrutiny.
Those who did attempt to invest their gambling revenues in illegal
CRIME CONTROL LEGISLATION, supra note 18, at 92.
24. See, e.g., ORGANIZ
25. Id.
26. The names of these lotteries are: The 50 lottery; Lucky 7 game; Baker's Dozen.
27. CoNSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5512 (1973).
28. Some states and foreign countries currently permit private businessmen to conduct gambling operations under state supervision. In Nevada, for example, the state tax
commission controls legal gambling by means of a license system under which all applicants must be screened by the Tax Commission Inspectors who are employed by the Tax
Commission which supervises the gambling houses operations and has the authority to
hold hearings and revoke licenses. TiE HONEST POLerCIAN's GuIDE, supra note 3, at 11-12.
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activities would be much more easily uncovered and put out of business.
The analogy to our country's experience with Prohibition is direct.
When large numbers of citizens want something very much, government cannot prevent them from obtaining it. If government attempts to do so, those individuals who are willing to break the law in
order to provide the goods or services, whether they be bootleggers or
gambling czars, will become wealthy and will have an unending supply
of customers. As some experts on vice crime have concluded, "We do
not face a choice between abolishing or legalizing gambling; the choice
is between leaving gambling and the vast profits which accrue from it in
the hands of criminals, or citizens taking it over and running it for the
benefit of society, or by licensing and taxation measures, controlling
it."

29

If it would be possible to divert even half of the law enforcement resources now allocated to investigating illegal gambling, there would be
far more man-power available to probe the other more serious activities
of organized crime. Indeed, the substantial revenues which the state
could derive from legalizing gambling could help finance investigations
of organized crime. 80 If the maximum penalties under the new Crimes
Code are utilized, and history indicates that they will not be, organized
gamblers might be somewhat inconvenienced but they shall continue to
flourish. A far more drastic measure is needed.
PROSTITUTION

One of the arguments used against the legalization of gambling
is that if our state legislature "gives up" its enforcement efforts and
legalizes one vice, there is every reason to expect that the citizenry will
soon be calling for the legalization of other vices such as prostitution.
The proponents of this position make a valid argument. Yet, in fact, it
is appropriate to analyze the costs and benefits of continuing to treat
prostitution as a crime. Although the President's Task Force Report on
Organized Crime indicates that prostitution plays a minor and declin29. Id. at 11.

30. More than twenty-five governments profit from conducting national lotteries. For
example. Kenya grosses $42,000 annually and Spain ,rosses $70 million each year from
gambling revenues. Id. This result could be achieved in Pennsylvania not only by an expanded state lottery but by taxing legalized gambling. At a 20 per cent tax rate, the
$246 million annual estimated receipts of the major numbers banks in Pennsylvania would
yield the state $49.2 million.
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ing role in organized crime's operations,31 there are still many cities in
which individual organized crime figures derive substantial sums of
money from running prostitution operations. First, let us consider how
Pennsylvania's laws treat this crime. Under the old Penal Code, one
who committed prostitution, aided or abetted prostitution, or permitted prostitution to occur at a place under his control was guilty of
a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment for
one year.3 2 The new Crimes Code considers prostitution to be a misdemeanor of the third degree which carries a maximum fine of $2,500
and a maximum prison sentence of one year.38 Thus, the new Crimes
Code does substantially increase the potential "cost of business" for
prostitutes who are apprehended by law enforcement officials. But, as
is the case with numbers writers, it is unlikely that many judges would
award the maximum penalties to poor and downtrodden women.
At the same time, however, the new Crimes Code has partially decreased the possible penalties for that aspect of prostitution in which
organized crime operatives directly engage-pandering, the promotion
of prostition. The old Penal Code made pandering a felony and persons
found guilty of procuring female inmates for houses of prostitution
were subject to fines of up to $5,000 and imprisonment for up to 10
years.3 4 Under the new Crimes Code those individuals who manage and
procure inmates for houses of prostitution, although subject to the
higher fine of $15,000, are only subject to imprisonment for a maximum of seven years, three years less than provided for by the old Penal
Code.15
In addition, it should be noted that the "customer" of the prostitute
is treated very gently by the criminal law. Under the new Crimes Code,
a person who hires a prostitute to engage in sexual activity with him is
only guilty of a summary offense which carries a maximum penalty of
90 days in jail or a $300 fine.3 6 One begins to question the philosophy
behind this law. The business man who promotes prostitution is a
felon; the prostitute, herself, is guilty of a misdemeanor. And the pub31. TASK FoRcE REPoRT, supra note 4, at 4.
32. Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, § 512.
33. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5902 (1973).

34. Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, § 513.
35. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5902 (1973). Such activities are considered to constitute a felony of the third degree. Individuals convicted of soliciting a person to patronize a prostitute or procuring a prostitute for a patron are guilty of the lesser offense of a
misdemeanor of the second degree and hence are subject to a fine of up to $5,000 and
imprisonment of up to two years.

36. Id. § 5902(e). The old Penal Code contained no comparable section.
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lic, which through its demand for the service causes these others to
operate their business, is only guilty of a summary offense. A strong
argument can be made that while our legislature wishes to punish prostitutes and panderers it does not wish to make visiting a prostitute a
dangerous experience for those upstanding citizens who occasionally
need the service of these women. If the public's sensibilities are outraged by prostitution, the customer is no less evil than his supplier. One
can understand that the promoter of prostitution, being a manager of
the illegal operations, should be treated more severely than the prostitute herself, but there seems to be no reason for treating the customer
so gently.
In sum, the changes in the possible penalties for prostitution-related
offenses seem self-contradictory and do not indicate whether the legislature intended to make the promotion of prostitution a more or a less
serious offense than under the old Penal Code. This situation can only
be interpreted to mean that today's legislature is indecisive as to how
it views the age-old art of prostitution. This ambivalence reflects the
ongoing debate in law enforcement circles as to whether prostitution
should remain a crime. Let us analyze the factors which the legislature
would have to take into account in deciding how serious a crime prostitution should be, if a crime at all. Although the state government has
established a state lottery, it has not set up state-run houses of prostitution; therefore, any comparison between the moral arguments underlying our gambling and prostitution laws does not stand up. Indeed,
even liberal thinkers must be repulsed at the notion of women selling
their bodies for profit. However, Professor Ernst Freund curtly responds to such arguments: "Not every standard of conduct that is fit to
be observed is also fit to be enforced."3 7 There is no denying that the costs
of permitting our law enforcement officials to enforce anti-prostitution
laws are very high; scarce law enforcement resources are diverted from
the investigation of other organized crime activities. Further, as is the
case with gambling, whenever society attempts to outlaw a service
which the public demands, an illegal market develops; those willing to
violate the law possess a monopoly and are free of government regulation. Former New York City Police Commissioner, Patrick Murphy,
certainly no friend of the prostitution syndicates, once warned, "By
charging our police with the responsibility to enforce the unenforce37. Crimes Without Victims, supra note 3, at 11.
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able, we subject them to disrespect and corruptive influences, and we
provide the organized criminal syndicates with the illicit industries
upon which they thrive."3 8
Beyond these considerations, there are more subtle factors which
some students of organized crime put forth as weighing in favor of the
legalization of prostitution. When a police department's chain of command demands that there be more arrests for prostitution, promotionconscious patrolmen who "aim to please" often develop dangerous
habits. It always is extremely difficult for police to obtain arrests for
prostitution-related offenses without engaging in illegal entrapments.
In times of vigorous law enforcement, prostitutes and panderers often
need much encouragement before they will provide their services to
strangers.3 9 Policemen may find themselves unlawfully creating the
crimes they are attempting to investigate. Further, in order to quickly
achieve visible results, enthusiastic policemen might engage in unlawful harassment in order to remove suspected prostitutes from the
streets. 40 Finally, it no doubt is demoralizing and degrading for a law
enforcement officer who is eager to "fight crime" to be assigned to spend
his time chasing loose women all night long.
The argument that the legislature should continue to outlaw prostitution because this vice increases venereal diseases does have some
merit. However, this argument is countered by respected studies which
conclude that prostitution accounts for approximately only 5 per cent
of current venereal disease; 41 ordinary promiscuity is vastly responsible
for the spread of such diseases. In any event, if prostitution were to be
legalized it could be regulated such that there would be far better
health protection than exists under the current situation. Regular compulsory medical inspections of women engaging in this profession could
insure that disease would be detected and treated at an early stage.
In so far as public solicitation by law-abiding prostitutes would of38. Id.
39. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAw 369 (1972):
[A) law enforcement official perpetrates an entrapment when for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime, he originates the idea of the crime and then induces
another person to engage in conduct constituting such a crime when the other person is not otherwise disposed to do so.
40.

THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 22.
See, e.g., A. DEUTSCH, THE PROSTITUTION RACKET IS BACK 63, 270-77 (1946); W.
KEARNE, THE SUBJECT PEOPLE DON'T TALK ABOUT (1958); Ball & Thomas, A Sociological,

41.

Neurological, Serological and Psychiatric Study of a Group of Prostitutes, in T. KENY,
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES OF PROSTITUTION AND THE MEANS OF COMBATING THEM,
GENEVA LEAGUE OF NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL QUESTIONS Part IV (Official
No. C26, 1943).
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fend some citizen's sensibilities, pro-legalization advocates argue that
it would not be difficult, by municipal ordinance, to confine the solicitation activities of prostitutes to certain zoned areas; indeed, they claim
there would be no need for prostitutes personally to advertise their
42
services if their customers knew where they could be found.
It should be noted that, according to Kinsey, almost 70 per cent of
the total white male population of the United States has had some experience with prostitutes.43 It is estimated that full-time prostitutes
earn approximately $1 billion per year, and that somewhere between
250,000 and 550,000 women work at prostitution on a more or less fulltime basis. 44 Although increased promiscuity may have hurt the market
for prostitutes, the battle to stop gentlemen from obtaining their pleasure is an immense job. In a typical year, there are over 42,000 arrests
for "prostitution and commercialized vice."' 45 In addition, thousands of
prostitutes are arrested annually for "disorderly conduct," so the true
statistics are probably quite higher.48 Clearly, prostitution has flourished
for many centuries and is extremely prevalant in Pennsylvania and the
rest of the nation; it would take a monumental law enforcement effort
to put all of Pennsylvania's panderers and prostitutes out of business.
Even if these efforts were successful, some warn that prostitutes provide
a sexual outlet for many men who, without it, would engage in even
47
more serious sexual offenses.

The author discussed these arguments not to lobby in favor of the
legalization of prostitution, but to point out that the societal costs of
outlawing prostitution are very great. This being the case, it is nonsensical to award hand-slap sentences to the customers of prostitutes and
less severe sentences to panderers than under the old Penal Code. No
one can fault the legislature for determining that the preservation of the
moral fiber of our Commonwealth requires that prostitution remain a
crime. Yet, it is irrational to make such a determination and then provide ineffectual sentences, especially in light of the arguments against
anti-prostitution laws discussed above. If the legislature is not pre42. This arrangment has worked successfully in London where street solicitation is
illegal. Although the streets are clear, prostitutes are discreetly available for those who
want them. See Crimes Without Victims, supra note 3, at 23.
43. A.C. KINSEY, W.R. POMEROY & C.E. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
595-604 (1948).
44.

C. WINICK & P. KINsi, THE LIVELY COMmERCE 4-5 (1971).

45. These statistics are taken from the Federal Government's Uniform Crime Reports
for 1968. See THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GumE, supra note 3, at 21.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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pared to enact penalties which are serious enough to deter those who
foster this vice, it is counter-productive for prostitution to remain a
crime. Our society cannot afford the luxury of outlawing prostitution
only for the sake of aesthetics.
LOAN

SHARKING

Second only to illegal gambling as a major source of revenue for organized crime is loan sharking. 48 Loan sharks are organized crime operatives who lend money at higher rates of interest than the legally
prescribed limits. Their customers are generally high-risk clients who
are refused credit by legitimate loan companies. Normally, they either
have defaulted on prior obligations or they cannot provide appropriate
collateral for the loan they are seeking.49 These borrowers include
heavy gamblers who are on losing streaks (many illegal gambling casinos maintain a resident loan shark to assist patrons who fall far in debt
early in the evening and want a chance to "get even"). 50 Other customers are drug addicts who need a substantial amount of funds to support their habits. Also, small businessmen who feel they can save their
dying businesses if they can get "one more loan" often visit loan sharks.
Usually the gambler keeps losing, the drug addict keeps needing money
to support his habit, and the small business man continues to be unable
to balance his books.
Consequently, the principal of the loans and the exorbitant amounts
of interest continue to grow. While interest rates have been known to
be as high as 150 per cent per week, the normal arrangement is "6 for
5," the borrower being expected to return $6.00 for every $5.00 he borrowed. 51 Payments sometimes are due by a certain hour on a certain
day, and the debtor who defaults by only a few minutes may find that
he has increased the size of his debt. 52 It is the profits attributable to

these exorbitant rates of interest, as well as the low risks involved,
which makes loan sharking so attractive to organized crime. 53 The loan
sharks are not really concerned with collecting the principal of the
loans back quickly. Indeed, they might even be disappointed if the
borrower too rapidly repaid the entire loan. The lender really is in
48.
49.

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
See REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 9, at 42.

50.

Id.

51.

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.

52.

Id.

53.

ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL LEGISLATION, supra note 18, at 69.
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business to perpetuate interest payments. 54 The victim's fear of embarrassment at the threatened exposure of his financial condition and,
the realistic fear of bodily harm are very forceful deterrents to the borrower's reporting of the lender to any law enforcement authority." Often the debtors are so frightened that they become criminals themselves
in order to obtain money to pay the interest which is due on their
loans. 56 Loan sharking often gives organized crime syndicates an inroad
to the infiltration of legitimate businesses and unions, and leads to the
corruption of government officials.5 7 The President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice considered loan
sharking to be the fifth ranking crime in terms of cost to the public,
equal to narcotics and ranking just below willful homicide. 8
Let us consider how the Pennsylvania Crimes Code has treated this
problem. The old Penal Code contained a series of blackmail laws
which prohibited the use of threats of physical violence or injury to
one's reputation as techniques for extorting money or other things of
value from a person. 59 The penalty for this type of activity was usually
a fine of up to $2,000 and imprisonment for up to three years.60 If the
threats included accusing the debtor of heinous crimes, the loan shark
was guilty of a felony and subject to a $5,000 fine and 10 years imprisonment.6 ' In addition, the old Penal Code most severely punished
those individuals who would extort money by threatening to kidnap
the debtor or his relatives or by threatening to destroy his property;
persons convicted of such conduct could receive a $7,000 fine and 15
62
years imprisonment.
Furthermore, if the loan sharks engaged in actual physical violence
they would be subject to aggravated assault and battery charges which
could yield them fines of $2,000 and imprisonment for up to three
years.63 Finally, although Pennsylvania does have some mild usury and
54. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
55. Id; REPORT OF ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 9, at 39.
56. REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 9, at 96.
57. Id.
58. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TAsK FORCE REPORT CRIME AND ITS IMPAcr-As ASSESSMENT OF CRIME 43 (1968).
59. Act of June 24,1939, Pa. P.L. 872, § 801.
60. Id. §§ 801-05.
61. Id. § 803.
62. Id. § 806.
63. Id. § 709. Aggravated assault and battery was defined as "unlawfully and maliciously inflicting upon another person, either with or without any weapon or instrument,
any grievous bodily harm, or unlawful cuts, stabs or wounds any other person." If the
actor's conduct was not severe enough to meet these standards, he still could have been
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lending laws, these statutes were not designed to deal with situations
where there was a willing or frightened customer and a forceful creditor.

64

Loan sharks often follow Theodore Roosevelt's philosophy and
speak softly while carrying their big sticks. One act of physical violence
is all that is necessary to point out to many potential borrowers that the
collection officers do not look favorably upon those who are tardy in
making their payments. Most collectors do not find it necessary to go
beyond the threat stage. These threats can be extremely subtle yet still
be most effective. As a result, it is usually impossible for even the ambitious prosecutor to obtain witnesses and other evidence in these cases.
Since proof most often hinges on the availability and credibility of the
victim as a witness and the degree of explicitness of any threats, the
laws existing under the old Penal Code were not effective in deterring
loan sharking.
Except for the reclassification of several offenses, the new Crimes
Code leaves the laws dealing with loan sharking where it found them.
The new Crimes Code does admirably combine several blackmail sections into one comprehensive provision entitled "theft by extortion." 65
convicted of ordinary assault and battery which carries a $1,000 fine and two years imprisonment. Id. § 708.
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 3-4 (1963) contains usury laws which establish the maximum legal rates of interest and provide that rates which are in excess of these limits
need not be paid. While this remedy gives the debtor a legal argument against his creditor, neither the loan sharks nor their victims ever pursue their claims in the courts, so
these usury laws are of no practical significance. Similarly, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6151-57
(1967), comprise the Small Loan Act which outlaws the making of loans of over $600 at
more than 6 per cent annual interest without a license to do so. Anyone who violates this
law is guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to three years imprisonment. Loans in violation of this law are considered unenforceable and the borrowers are not required to
pay either the principal or the interest on their loans. If the lender is properly licensed,
he is permitted to charge up to a rate of 36 per cent annual interest on the first $150 of
the principal, 24 per cent on the next $100 and 12 per cent on the final $300 loaned. In
addition, the Consumer Discount Company Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6201-19 (1967),
similarly prohibits making loans under $3,500 in excess of 6 per cent annual interest by
unlicensed persons and provides a similar possible prison penalty. If properly licensed,
the lender can collect up to 7.5 per cent annual interest on installment contracts to be
paid within three years and 6 per cent on amounts due after three years, plus service
charges and other various fees. Here again, these acts are not realistically suited to be
used in prosecuting loan sharks. Even though the penalties are criminal, the money limit
of $3,500 in the Consumer Discount Company Act excludes a large percentage of loan
shark's transactions, and no one normally brings these lending arrangements to the
attention of law enforcement officials. Obviously, a borrower who pointed to these laws
when he was approached by a "collector" for a loan-sharking syndicate would not win
his case.
65. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3923 (1973). This section in part states:
A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally obtains or withholds property of another by threatening to:
(1) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit another criminal offense;
(2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense;
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Under this new provision, if the amount involved exceeds $2,000, as is
often the case with loan sharking transactions, extortion is a felony of
the third degree which carries a maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment and a $15,000 fine; 0 this sentence is comparable to the
most serious penalty possible under the old blackmail law. Otherwise,
so long as at least $200 is involved (or if the property was taken by
threat, regardless of the amount involved), the loan shark is guilty of a
misdemeanor of the first degree and hence subject to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 7 Also noteworthy is the fact that the
new Crimes Code contains a stiff provision outlawing aggravated assault, which now is a felony of the second degree carrying up to 10
years imprisonment and a $25,000 fine if done under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; in all
other cases, if a deadly weapon is involved, the perpetrator would be
guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. 68
Although these laws have been handsomely codified, this does not
change the fact that they are inadequate to deter sophisticated loan
sharks. What is needed is a new piece of legislation which is designed
specifically to deal with the techniques of syndicated loan sharks. Realizing the need for such a law, one scholarly journal has suggested a very
forward-looking model statute, 69 patterned after the modern loan sharking statute which is contained in Title II of the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 1968.70 The adoption of such a law in Pennsylvania has been supported by the state crime commission.7 1 This
model statute puts forth a workable substantive law and in addition
deals with some of the difficulties of the evidence-gathering process.
The statute outlaws "the extortionate extention of credit," which is
defined as a loan where both the creditor and the debtor understand
that any delay or failure of repayment will result in the use, or
threatened use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to
the person, reputation, or property of any individual 2 Thus, the statute
(3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule;
(4) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.
66. Id. § 3903(a).
67. Id. § 3903(b).
68. Id. § 2702.
69. Loan-Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, 5 COLUM. J. LAW &
Soc. Pos.
129-36 (1969).
70. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970). It should be noted that section 896 explains that this
federal statute "does not preempt any field of law with respect to what state legislation
would be permissible in the absence of this chapter."
71. REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 9, at 95-96.
72. See supra note 69, at 129.
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is designed to deal with the more subtle tactics of loan sharks and is
activated by threats against the borrower's family, business, associates,
and friends.
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the model act sets forth
realistic alternatives to the virtually unobtainable direct testimony in
loan sharking cases. 73 A rebuttable presumption of guilt of the crime
of the extortionate extension of credit is created when evidence is
introduced which shows three things. First, it must be proven that
the interest rate is criminally usurious, which the model act defines
as interest exceeding 25 per cent per annum. Second, the total loan
outstanding, including interest, must exceed $100. Third, the state
must show that the debtor reasonably believed that extortionate collection tactics would be used because he knew that the creditor had a
reputation for using such tactics.7 4 Under this innovative approach,
when the debtor is not willing to testify, evidence of the loan shark's
reputation in the debtor's community is admissible to show the debtor's
75
probable understanding of the terms of the loan.
Another section of the statute directly prohibits criminal usury-the
lending of money at annual interest rates over 25 per cent-unless
specifically authorized by law.7" Violations of this section could be
shown without any proof of extortion.7 7 Also, other sections of the
model statute provide for witness immunity and special protection of
witnesses as necessary.71 Finally, as the Pennsylvania Crime Commission
has stressed, an extremely effective statute would have to specifically
make it a crime to finance extortionate lending and criminal usury.7 9
Such a prohibition is necessary if our laws are to reach the organized
crime leaders who provide the funds that enable the lower level racketeers to engage in loan sharking.
The model statute described above is obviously not perfect and there
are many other variations which could be suggested. Suffice to say that
anything along the lines described above would be far superior to the
existing situation. At least four states have already adopted this type of
73.

Id. at 130-31.

74. For a further analysis of these provisions, see

ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL LEcISLA-

TION, supra note 18, at 74.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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statute"0 and a bill proposing a similar law has been introduced in the
Pennsylvania legislature."' Such a statute is long overdue in Pennsylvania; until it is adopted the loan sharking czars need be no more fearful
of apprehension and possible penalties under the new Crimes Code
than they were under the old law.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT

RACKETEERING

It is surprising that in a state such as Pennsylvania, where organized
labor is such a vital force, that neither the old Penal Code nor the new
Crimes Code contains any provisions which effectively deal with the
wide-spread and tragic problem of labor-management racketeering. As
discussed above, organized crime will become involved in any situation
where it believes a profit can be made. Organized crime leaders have
discovered that they can obtain many valuable benefits if they are able
to gain control over labor unions. These benefits include not only
special access to union treasuries and welfare pension funds, but also
include the opportunity for extorting large sums of money from the
employers which these unions serve.8 2 In industrial states throughout
the country, organized criminal syndicates have been able to gain control over unions by bribing key officials or by direct threats of violence
against them. Sometimes, union leaders themselves are co-opted into
the criminal syndicate's heirarchy. Once this is accomplished, the organized crime figures are in an excellent position to demand huge sums
of money from the employers who are desirous of continuing the
smooth operation of their plants; the uncooperative employer can expect threatened or actual violence, shut-downs, and extended strikes.ss
On the other hand, those employers who meet the syndicate's demands
for payments can expect to be blessed with "sweetheart" contracts
which rob the naive and trusting union members of many possible
benefits.8 4
Furthermore, once organized crime figures have established "close
working relationships" with the union officials who administer the
union's pension and treasury funds, the criminal syndicates orchestrate
80. These states are Colorado, Florida, New Jersey and Wisconsin.
81. On June 12, 1972, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed the loan
sharking bill, House Bill No. 918.
82. See REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 9, at 55-59.
83. See TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
84. For an example of the use of this technique in Pennsylvania, see REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 9, at 59.
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outrageously advantageous business deals with the unions. One oftenused technique is for a pension fund to purchase land or buildings
from an organized crime operative at a cost which far exceeds what the
criminal syndicate paid for it. Often the syndicate will have purchased
the property only several months before the subsequent sale, knowing
full well that a cooperative purchaser would be found as soon as a respectable amount of time had passed.8 5 These sales yield the organized
crime figures a quick profit, provide the corrupt labor leaders with
"cash bonuses" or, in the case of honest but frightened labor officials,
with freedom from fear of bodily harm. The only losers are the union
members whose dues have been used to purchase property of little value
at an inflated cost.8 6
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice pointed out that beyond all these consequences the
infiltration of labor unions by organized crime facilitates the establishment of many of the syndicate's other illegal activities. Anxious to avoid
syndicate-created labor strife, the owners of businesses, such as trucking
and construction companies, will often condone gambling, loan sharking and even pilferage by their employees or other agents of the syndicates who operate on their business premises. It cannot be said that the
criminal syndicates do not "watch over" the unions which cooperate
with them. Experienced organized crime operatives often work hand-inhand with over-zealous union leaders to insure that competing unions
or non-union workers do not take jobs from their members. The uninformed contractor or merchant who attempts to employ such non-union
workmen will often be paid a visit by an organized crime-sponsored
goon squad which will explain to him the merits of dealing with the
union which the syndicate supports. The contractor who does not "see
the light" is often rewarded by having his construction sabotaged or
his life threatened.
While most law enforcement agencies have long been aware that
87
large-scale labor racketeering is occurring throughout Pennsylvania,
85. Organized crimes' manipulation of union pension and welfare funds were probed
and disclosed by congressional investigations led by Senator John McClellan. See J.
McClellan, LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTS, FIRST INTERIM REPORT, S. Rep. No. 1417, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); SECOND INTERIM REPORT, S. Rep. No. 621 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (parts
1 & 2 1959); FINAL REPORT, S. Rep. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (parts 1-4 1960).
86. Because these purchases are presumably based on the "honest business judgement"
of the union officials, it has proven extremely difficult to prosecute these officials for
breach of their fiduciary obligations.
87. For an example of this type of conduct being exposed in Pennsylvania, see REPORT
ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 9, at 55-59.
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the old Penal Code did not contain provisions which could be expected
to deal effectively with this on-going problem.
Undeniably, there were laws which prohibited the blatant physical
violence and threats which organized crime utilizes as a last resort when
it attempts to infiltrate unions or convince contractors to deal only with
the unions which it supports. The old Penal Code contained blackmail
laws88 and the previously mentioned assault and battery offenses8 9 to
deal with some of the tactics of labor rackeeteers. There was even a
section carrying a $500 fine and one year jail sentence which could be
used against union officials who would accept a bribe in return for improperly using their position for the benefit of a criminal syndicate; the
rackeeteer who offered the bribe would also be guilty of this crime. 90
In addition, laws prohibiting arson 9' and "malicious mischief" against
real or personal property92 could be used to prosecute individuals who
went beyond the threat stage. Even under the old Penal Code, arson
and the use of explosives to destroy property were serious felonies
carrying twenty and ten years jail terms respectively. 93 However, these
laws did not reach the subtle understandings and implied threats that
are the key to the success of organized crime in this area; also, there
was no realistic statute which would facilitate prosecution for this type
of conduct.
While going a long way to improve the laws in this area, the new
Crimes Code does not totally remedy the deficiencies of the old Penal
Code. Admittedly, those who engage in aggravated assault and battery
face potentionally harsher penalties, 94 and the new arson statute is far
88. See discussion of the blackmails law, Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, §§ 80106, at notes 59-62, supra. Of particular relevance are id. § 802, "Blackmail by Injury to
Reputation or Business;" id. § 804. "Blackmail by Threatening Murder, Destruction of
Particular Property;" and id. § 806, "Blackmail by Threatening to Kidnap or Damage
Property Generally."
89. Id. §§ 708-09. See discussion at note 63 supra.
90. Id. § 667.
91. Id. § 905. A person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to any "dwelling house,
kitchen, ship, barn, stable, or other out house" was guilty of arson, a felony, subject to a
$10,000 fine and twenty years imprisonment. Anyone willfully or maliciously setting fire
to any building, "not a parcel of a dwelling house" was subject to a $5,000 fine and 10
years imprisonment.
92. Id. § 916.1. Malicious mischief to real or personal property provides that whoever
shall willfully and maliciously destroy, damage or injure any article or item of real or
personal property of another of a value in excess of fifty dollars ($50) is guilty of a misdemeanor, and is subject to a $300 fine and one year imprisonment. For offenses involving
personal property of a value of less than $50, the penalties is a fine of up to $100 and
costs of prosecution and in default of that, up to three months imprisonment. Id. § 917.
Malicious mischief by explosives to do bodily harm to any person or to destroy any
property.
93. Id. § 905.
94. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2702 (1973).
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more rational in its classifications.95 The new Crimes Code further provides that the labor leader who deals with racketeers, not out of fear

but because of his desire for personal profit, is guilty of a misdemeanor
of the second degree, as is the organized crime operative who makes the
bribe. 96 There is even a new criminal mischief statute which correctly
contains sentences that are more in line with the actual amount of damage done than is the case under the old Penal Code. 97 Most importantly,
subsection (a)4 of the previously mentioned "Theft by Extortion"
statute9" specifically outlaws the intentional obtaining or withholding
95. Id. § 3301, related the penalty to the seriousness of the danger caused, and not
the type of building involved. This section in part states:
(a) Endangering persons-A person commits a felony of the first degree if he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether his own property or that of another, and thereby recklessly places another person in danger of death or bodily
injury.
(b) Endangering property-A person commits a felony of the second degree if he:
(I) starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent of destroying a building or occupied structure of another;
(2) intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property
or on that of another, and thereby recklessly places a building or occupied structure
of another in danger of damage or destruction; or
(3) starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent of destroying or damaging any
property, whether his own or of another, to collect insurance for such losses.
While both felonies of the first and second degree carry a maximum fine of $25,000,
the former carries a 20 year maximum sentence and the latter a 10 year maximum
sentence.
96. Id. § 4108, provides in part:
(a) Corrupt employe, agent or fiduciary-An employe, agent or fiduciary commits a
misdemeanor of the second degree when, without the consent of his employer or
principal, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person
upon agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in
relation to the affairs of his employer or principal.
(c) Solicitation-A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he confers,
or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit the acceptance of which would be criminal
under subsections (a) or (b)of this section.
It is a misdemeanor of the second degree if the actor intentionally causes pecuniary
loss in excess of $1,000 or a misdemeanor of the third degree if he intentionally or
recklessly causes pecuniary loss in excess of $500. Otherwise criminal mischief is a
summary offense.
97. Id. § 3304, provides:
(a) Offense defined-A person is guilty of criminal mischief if he:
1. damages tangible property of another intentionally, recklessly, or by negligence
in the employment of fire, explosives, or other dangerous means listed in section 3302(a) of this title (relating to causing or risking catastrophe);
2. intentionally or recklessly tampers with tangible property of another so as to
endanger person or property; or
3. intentionally or recklessly causes another to suffer pecuniary loss by deception
or threat.
(b) Grading-Criminal mischief is a felony of the third degree if the actor intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000, or a substantial interruption or impairment of public communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or
other public service. It is a misdemeanor of the second degree if the actor intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of $1,000, or a misdemeanor of the third
degree if he intentionally or recklessly causes pecuniary loss in excess of $500. Otherwise criminal mischief is a summary offense.
98. See note 65 supra.
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of property of another by threatening to "bring about or continue a
strike, boycott or other collective unofficial action, if the property is
not demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest
the actor purports to act." 99 This section is clearly designed to outlaw
the basic technique utilized by labor racketeers.
Unfortunately, these laws are not structured in a way that can be expected to produce substantial convictions for labor racketeering. The
situation is similar to that presented by loan sharking operations. Here
again, convictions under the new Crimes Code can normally only be
obtained where the labor leaders or company officials who were bribed
or threatened by the organized crime operatives are willing to testify.
Obviously, men who have received pay-offs from organized crime or
who have dealt with the criminal syndicates because of fear for their
lives do not make the most cooperative witnesses. The process of locating these "victims" is not easy and once they are found it is even more
difficult to obtain honest information and testimony from them. Some
help is provided by the duress law which provides that an actor is not
guilty of an offense he was coerced to commit by threats against himself
or another. 10 0 This law might encourage some exploited labor leaders
to come forward, but it certainly would not guarantee their future
safety nor justify their receiving generous bribes from organized crime.
In addition, the duress law cautions that the defense which it provides
is unavailable if the actor "recklessly placed himself in a situation in
which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress."' 0'1 Thus,
the labor leader who was tempted to deal with racketeers because he
thought it might be profitable or valuable to him politically, must pay
for "toying with the devil." Such is often the case, and these men certainly would not make very good witnesses for the prosecution. All of
these considerations are in addition to the major problem that the
threats and understandings involved in labor racketeering often are so
subtle that many of the laws described above would never come into
play.
It should be noted that the federal government enacted the Hobbs
Act 10 2 in 1946 to combat labor racketeering activities. Passed as an
amendment to the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act, the Hobbs Act pro99. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3923(4) (1973). For an analysis of this section and
the possible penalties for violating it, see text corresponding to note 65 supra.

100. Id. § 509(a).
101. Id. § 309(b).
102. Anti-Racketeering Act (Hobbs Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).

833

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 12: 812, 1974

vides for imprisonment for up to twenty years and a $10,000 fine for
attempting to obstruct or delay interstate commerce by robbery or extortion. 1 3 Extortion is defined to include the taking of another's property
with consent which was induced by the wrongful use or threatened use
of force or violence. 04 While the intent of this law is admirable, the statute is only activated when interstate activity is proven; this prohibits
its use against much of the labor racketeering which occurs in Pennsylvania. Furthermore, even when the statute is interpreted liberally, it
still is of too limited a scope to constitute an effective response to many
of the sophisticated labor racketeering techniques which are discussed
above. 10 5 In any case, only federal authorities, whose limited resources
must often be directed elsewhere, can utilize this statute. The situation
in Pennsylvania is severe enough to merit the adoption of its' own statute, which local and state law enforcement officials can use as the basis
for investigations and prosecutions.
The only solution seems to be the enactment of a statute similar to
the one suggested to deal with loan sharking. Just as the proposed loan
sharking statute would outlaw the "extortionate extension of credit"
the labor racketeering statute would prohibit the "extortionate control
of labor unions" to cover those situations where labor unions are infiltrated by organized crime figures; a related statute would outlaw the
"extortionate establishment of business relationships" to handle those
instances where businessmen are coerced to deal only with the unions
which organized crime favors. These statutes would achieve two goals.
First, they would make actionable the subtle and implied threats of the
labor racketeer by defining the crimes to include situations where both
the racketeer and the union or company official understood that a failure to agree to the suggested relationship would result in the use, or
threatened use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to
the person, reputation, or property of any individual. Second, again
following the logic of the proposed loan sharking law, the new statutes
would provide an alternative to the need for the direct testimony of
frightened victims by providing that a rebuttable presumption of guilt
would arise when the state shows that: (1) the outsider has improperly
interfered with the internal decision-making process of the union or
businessman; (2) over $100 is involved in the affected business deci103.
104.
105.
CAN

Id.
Id.
For one analysis of this law, see Woll, Misapplying Two Federal Laws, 78 AMEiuFEDERATIONIST 16-18 (1971).
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sions; and (3) the union leader or business leader reasonably believed
that extortionate tactics would be used if he did not agree to the outsiders' demands or that the outsider had a reputation for using such
tactics. Here again, the key to this section being used successfully is that
when the victim is not willing to testify, the outsider's reputation in the
victim's community is admissible to show the victim's probable understanding of the consequences of his refusing to deal with the outsider.
While these suggested new statutes certainly would need to be carefully drafted and applied, they are essential if law enforcement is to
have the tools it needs to eradicate this cancerous growth on labormanagement relations.
INFILTRATION OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS

Although the above analysis might lead one to conclude that Pennsylvania has not been a very forward looking jurisdiction in the field
of organized-crime legislation, there is one shining star in the new
Crimes Code which is extremely important and worthy of detailed attention. This is CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911 (1973), entitled
"Corrupt Organizations.' 106 The law itself explains the very troubling
situation which precipitated its enactment:
Organized crime exists on a large scale within the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, engaging in the same patterns of unlawful conduct which characterize its activities nationally; vast amounts of
money and power accumulated by organized crime are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate businesses operating within the Commonwealth, together with all of the techniques
of violence, intimidation, and other forms of unlawful conduct
through which such money and power are derived; in furtherance
of such infiltration and corruption, organized crime utilizes and
applies to its unlawful purposes laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania confering and relating to the privilege of engaging
in various types of businesses and designed to insure that such
businesses are conducted in furtherance of the public interest and
the general economic welfare of the Commonwealth; such infiltration and corruption provide an outlet for illegally obtained capital, harm innocent investors, entrepreneurs, merchants and consumers, interfere with free competition and thereby constitute a
106. This statute was not promulgated as part of the general revision of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. It was drafted and proposed by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission
in cooperation with the Pennsylvania House Committee on Law and Order. Entitled the
Pennsylvania Corrupt Organization Act of 1970, it became law in 1970.
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substantial danger to the economic and general welfare of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania .... 107
The infiltration and control of legitimate businesses has become the
most sophisticated enterprise of organized crime. Many of the personal
and business goals of organized crime's leaders can only be achieved by
their infiltrating legitimate businesses. l0 8 Briefly, a legitimate business
front enables the syndicate leaders to acquire respectability by having a
justification for their huge incomes. When an organized crime figure
can describe himself as a "business executive," and point to the companies which he owns, he has a strong base of operation for dealing with
political and public officials, as well as other businessmen. Moreover,
having profitable businesses gives crime czars reportable income to
cover their provable expenditures which the Internal Revenue Service
might probe; this makes it extremely difficult for them to be indicted
for income tax evasion. In many instances, the businesses which organized crime infiltrates need not even be profitable. As indicated
above, the organized crime figure often is not as interested in making
more money as he is in having a place to "wash" money that he has obtained from other criminal activities such as organized gambling and
loan sharking. 10 9 Organized crime, therefore, frequently takes over
businesses which are of a nature such that it is very difficult to verify
the actual revenues generated by them. This type of business includes
laundromats, vending machines, and juke boxes." 0 Enough money can
be funneled through these businesses to justify the racketeer's high life
style. In addition, the businesses provide a cover for other illegal operations. For example, "bag men" who are part of a crime czar's gambling
syndicate can be carried on a vending machine company's payroll, even
though they would not have any real responsibilities at the company.
This would protect the "bag men" from prosecution for tax evasion
and at the same time would also give them a secure place from which
to operate."'
Although many of these businesses are originally infiltrated for the
reasons discussed above, organized crime figures often find that they
can make these businesses extremely profitable ventures themselves.
107. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 911(a)(2)-(5) (1973).
108. For an analysis of this phenomenon and actual Pennsylvania case studies, see
REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 9, at 47-55.
109. See, e.g., ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL LEGISLATION, supra note 18, at 55.
110. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
111. See ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL LEGISLATION, supra note 18, at 55.
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This is often possible because organized crime does not have to be concerned with whether all its managment techniques are legal. Dominated
labor unions can provide cheap labor and freedom from strikes; the
syndicate's political contacts can protect them from regulatory agencies
which are allegedly overseeing the operation of the business. 112 In
addition, the honest businessman is almost always unable to compete
with a syndicate-controlled enterprise that is attempting to destroy its
competition. Because of the enormous receipts which syndicates obtain
from their illegal enterprises (most of which is tax free), they can
temporarily undersell any competition and easily absorb the losses incurred in doing so until the competition is driven out of business. 118
Finally, a competitor's salesman who is using normal sales techniques
will find it difficult to compete for business with an organized crime's
salesman who threatens the life of potential buyers who would be so
bold as to refuse to do business with him. For example, in one city
studied by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice a restaurant chain that was infiltrated by
organized crime made certain that individual restaurant franchise
holders bought products only from syndicate-owned businesses by
using "quality control" inspectors who regularly checked on the in1. 4
dividual restauranteurs' purchasing habits.

If a racketeer-controlled business is not profitable for some reason,
organized crime can always find a way to recoup its investment. If
quick funds are needed and a business is not producing profits, the
syndicate can easily arrange for a "devastating fire" to destroy the
business's physical assets, then collect the insurance and invest elsewhere. Realizing that insurance companies are not so naive as to
repeatedly compensate syndicate leaders whose businesses always seem
to explode or collapse, organized crime has found other ways to make
money from unsuccessful businesses. One of their favorite techniques is
the planned bankruptcy or "scam." 115 After the racketeer has either
formed or taken over a not-so-profitable corporation, enough money is
funneled into the business that creditors are made to believe that the
corporation is succeeding and should be able to pay its future bills.116
112. REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 9, at 48.
113. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4,at 5.
114. Id.
115. For a complete discussion of this technique, see RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA,
STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS: PROTECTING YOUR BUSINESS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME (1968).
116. Id. at 12.
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In fact, sophisticated racketeers will pay the corporation's bills for a
couple of months in order to establish its credit. Once this is accomplished, the racketeers will purchase a large quantity of merchandise which is capable of being sold quickly, is difficult to trace, and is
readily transportable. 11 7 Once received, the merchandise is sold immediately; the racketeers are confident that there will be plenty of eager
customers because they are prepared to sell the merchandise at a price
far below cost. When the time comes to pay the creditors, the scam
operators will have disappeared, with all of the business's cash receipts. 1" 8 To protect himself, the organized crime figure who masterminds and finances this type of arrangement will not have his name
directly associated with the business, and the owner of record, who is
often a victim of syndicate loan sharks, will have been threatened sufficiently that he is willing to take any consequences that this situation
might bring to him.
One additional important result of the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime figures should be noted. When crime czars
maintain legitimate business fronts and can appear to be "pillars of
the community," they are able to endear themselves to public officials
and political leaders. The methods utilized to achieve this intimacy
vary from direct bribes to generous campaign contributions to invitations to invest in the syndicate's lucrative enterprises.11 9 In return, it is
not at all unusual for these prominent officials to appear as character
120
witnesses for racketeers who have the misfortune of standing trial.
After the testimony of these witnesses is received, the defense attorneys
vigorously argue that it is clear that the defendant is an asset to his
community and should be given a light sentence, if convicted at all.
Similarly, syndicate leaders often make charitable contributions-donating wings of hospitals and social halls in churches-as a kind of business
expense; they know that these contributions will yield them great
dividends in terms of associations and respectability. These connections
can bring the syndicate leaders special treatment from regulatory
agencies and a "hands-off" policy from law enforcement officials. The
21
sad result is often the nullification of government.'
117. Id.
118. Id. at 13.
119. REPORT ON ORGANIZED CQumE, supra note 9, at 65.
120. For a documentation of this phenomenon, see REPORT OF ORGANIZED CRIME, supra
note 9, at 69-70. This report contains a listing of the prominent officials who have appeared in court on behalf of known organized crime figures.
121. Id. at 65.
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The Pennsylvania legislature deserves much credit for directing its
attention to these complex activities and enacting the Corrupt Organizations Act to deal with the problem. This act, which is directly
patterned after part of the comprehensive Federal Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970,122 makes it unlawful to invest income derived from
a pattern of racketeering activity in any business enterprise. The
Pennsylvania statute specifically provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity in which the person participated as a principal, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in the acquisition of any interest in, or
123
the establishment or operation of, any enterprise ....
A "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined as two or more acts, at
least one of which occurred after the effective date of the act, which are
indictable under several provisions of the Crimes Code, including
gambling, loan sharking, prostitution, bribery and corrupt influence,
arson, and most of the other violent felonies in which organized crime
operatives might engage. 124 The act further explains that if it is shown
that over half of the defendant's aggregate income for two or more
years immediately preceeding such a business investment was derived
from a pattern of racketeering activity, a rebuttable presumption arises
that this investment included income derived from a pattern of rack1 25
eteering activity.
The act also specifically prohibits organized crime from gaining
control over businesses by violence and threats; the statute makes it
unlawful for any person to acquire or maintain any interest in an
enterprise through a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 126 Moreover,
the act explicitly prohibits the use of such techniques in the conduct of
an ongoing enterprise's affairs. 127 Thus, arson, mugging, and bribing
public officials will no longer be tolerated as management tools for
gaining an edge over the competition. It is also unlawful for persons
128
to conspire to engage in any of the conduct described above.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See 18 U.S.C.

§§

1961-68 (Supp. 1972).
§ 911(b)(1) (1973).

CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§
§

911(h).
911(b)(1).
911(b)(2).
911(b)(3).
911(b)(4).
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Not only is this law as sophisticated as the forces with which it must
do battle, it also contains severe and appropriate remedies. Anyone
12 9
convicted of violating this law is guilty of a felony of the first degree,
the most serious offense under the new Crimes Code with the exception
of first degree murder, and hence faces up to 20 years imprisonment
and a $25,000 fine. In addition, the legislature not only provided for
the punishment of the syndicate operatives involved in these ventures,
it also dealt with the equally important problem of stopping the
operations of these cancerous businesses themselves. Whenever it is
established that a violation of this law has occurred, the courts have the
power to award appropriate civil remedies, including:
..ordering any person to divest himself of any interest direct or

indirect, in the enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on
future activities or investments of any person, including but not
limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type
of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in; making due provisions
for the rights of innocent persons, ordering the dissolution of the
enterprise, ordering the denial, suspension or revocation of charters
of domestic corporations, certificates or authority authorizing
foreign corporations to do business within the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, licenses, permits, or prior approval granted to any
enterprise by any department or agency of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania; or prohibiting the enterprise from engaging in any
business.13 0
These remedies taken together not only remove the individuals involved from the business community, but go a long way to thwart the
goals of their would-be successors who would like to use the established
businesses of their convicted friends for their own illegal purposes.
Furthermore, in the case of the civil remedies, the burden of proof is
much more easily met1 31 and convictions should be obtained far more
readily.
Finally, it should be noted that the Attorney General, who is given
the major responsibility for enforcing this law, 132 has been given the
129. Id. § 911(c).
130. Id. § 911(d)(1).
131. Id. § 911(d)(4) Criminal convictions require "proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
The civil proceedings discussed above only demand that the lesser burden of proof by a
"preponderance of the evidence" be met.
132. Id. § 911(e), which states:
(1) The Attorney General shall have the power and duty to enforce the provisions of
this section, including the authority to issue civil investigative demands . . . institute
proceedings . . . and to take such actions as may be necessary to ascertain and investigate alleged violations of this section.
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tools he needs in order to gather sufficient evidence to obtain convictions under this act. Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person or enterprise may be in possession of documentary
material which is relevant to this type of racketeering investigation,
he may issue a civil investigative demand requiring the production of
such material for examination."m In addition, whenever an individual
refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to comply with a civil investigative demand, the Attorney General may invoke
Pennsylvania's witness immunity provision 13 4 in order to compel the
production of the documents. 33 Anyone who refuses to comply with the
demand after such being given immunity is subject to criminal con38
tempt charges.
The only real criticism which can be registered against this new law
is that it has not been utilized since its enactment. Probably, this is
partially the result of the statute's complexity; law enforcement officials
must train their staffs to seek out the kind of evidence which would
prove a violation of this statute. More significantly, some prosecutors
might legitimately fear that certain provisions of this new law may be
subject to constitutional challenge. 37 Nonetheless, the effectiveness and
(2) The Attorney General and the District Attorneys of the several counties shall have
concurrent authority to institute criminal proceedings under the provisions of this
section.
(3) Nothing contained in this subsection shall be constructed to limit the regulatory
or investigative authority of any department or agency of the Commonwealth whose
functions might relate to persons, enterprises or matters falling within the scope of
this section.
133. Id. § 911(f).
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 640.1 (1970).
135. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(g) (1973).
136. Id.
137. It should be expected that the first racketeer to be prosecuted under this new law
will argue that several of its provisions are unconstitutional. First, the rebuttable presumption that an investment was made from income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity whenever it is shown that over half of the defendant's aggregate income for
two or more years was acquired from racketeering activity could be challenged on due
process grounds. Admittedly, a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as
arbitrary and unconstitutional unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance
that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proven facts on which
it is made
depend.
See,A.2d
e.g., 230
Leary
v. United States, 395 U.s. 6 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Owens,
441 toPa.
318, 271
(1970).
Since it is possible
an organized crime
might, on occasion, not invest the money derived from his that
racketeering activity ih czar
his
legitimate business enterprises, there are instances when this presumption would not be
cates is to invest vice money in respectable businesses; although the presumption
valid.
However,
it is generally agreed that the normal modus operandi of criminaliight
syndisometimes
be rebutted,
a basis for it certainly does exist. Second, it may be contended
that the act violated due process because it can be unfairly harmful to innocent
stockholders in a business which racketeers choose to infiltrate. For example, any purchase
of
securities on the open market by a racketeer for the purpose of investment is
a violation
of this law if the purchase amounted in the aggregate to more than 1 per cent
of the outstanding stock of any one class. Thus, if a violation of the statute was proven, the inno-
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constitutionality of the statute will never be known until it is tested in
the courts. The statute must be utilized and then modified if necessary.
It would be a tragic shame if the one statute contained in the new
Crimes Code which is truly designed to combat a major industry of
organized crime sits idle.
ILLEGAL NARCOTIcs TRAFFIC

Only one major industry of organized crime has not been discussedthe illegal narcotics traffic. Little need be said about the devastating
effects of the illegal sale of narcotics. The life of a drug addict is not a
pleasant one. He often becomes a thief in order to support his habit and
he lives in constant fear of being "cut off" by his supplier when he can
not make his daily payments. Because of the large amounts of cash and
the international connections necessary for conducting the complex
arrangements which the sale of narcotics involves, those who are engaged in the illegal narcotics business must be very organized indeed.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice explains that the distribution of heroin, for example,
requires movement of the drug through four or five levels between the
importer and the street peddler.138 Because of the effectiveness of the
federal investigatory and prosecutory agencies and the severity of mandatory federal narcotics penalties, there is reason to believe that the
major criminal syndicates are largely restricting their activities to importing and wholesale distribution.1 3 9 They tend to stay away from
smaller scale wholesale transactions and deal at the retail level, where
there is a greater chance of law enforcement interference; those arrangements appear to be handled by independent narcotics pushers. 140 This
cent stockholders, theoretically, might find their business being dissolved by a court. This
argument lacks merit because the wide range of civil remedies available under the statute
enable the judge to make due provision for the rights of innocent persons; there is no
greater reason to fear an unfair result here than in any other situation where a judge
is given the discretion to enforce equitable remedies. Third, because the statute requires
that only one act of racketeering activity need occur after the effective date of the act
and the offense is only committed if the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering
activity, some might argue that the statute is void as being an unconstitutional ex post
facto law. See US. CONsT. art. 1 § 9. It is most unlikely that such a contention would prevail; the statute is not violated until after the investment in the business takes place and
until an act of racketeering activity has occurred after the effective date of the act; the
Corrupt Organization Act is not punishing a defendant for actions which he took before
the effective date of the act.
138. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note. 4, at 3.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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being the case, any effective investigation of organized crime's higherlevel involvement in narcotics requires a multi-state and often international investigation, which can only be conducted by the federal government. It alone has the resources and legal standing to undertake such
probes.
The illegal activities of the lower level drug pushers and addicts in
Pennsylvania, of which there are quite a substantial number, 141 are
regulated not by the Crimes Code but by Pennsylvania's health laws' 42
and hence are beyond the scope of this article. Although one can question the propriety and aesthetics of placing all of Pennsylvania's drug
laws in the Health Code, nevertheless, the new statute which governs
this area of the law, the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 43 is quite comprehensive and should be a most effective
tool in the hands of conscientious prosecutors. It is only necessary that
there be a coordinated effort by all local law enforcement agencies and
a sufficient allocation of manpower to this problem. Such an effort, in
conjunction with the investigations undertaken by the federal authorities, should result in a most effective attack on the illegal narcotics
traffic.
CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

No analysis of the new Crimes Code's treatment of organized crime
would be complete without a discussion of how the Crimes Code deals
with public officials who are corrupted by the criminal syndicates. At a
time when the public's confidence in its government officials is at a
devastatingly low level, it is particularly significant to note the sober
conclusion of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice that "All available data indicate that orga' 44
nized crime flourishes only where it has corrupted public officials.'
Citizens who deal with bookies, prostitutes, loan sharks, labor racketeers, and drug pushers are the customers of organized crime; crime
141. Statistics compiled by the United States Bureau of Narcotics in 1967 revealed
that there were approximately 1600 heroin addicts in Pennsylvania. It is estimated that
the daily cost of maintaining heroin addictions is at least $15, giving an average yearly
cost of $8.7 million for the addicts in Pennsylvania. See REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME,
supra note 9, at 43.
142. The relevant statute is the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act
which became fully effective on June 14, 1972. This statute is contained in PA. STAT, ANN.
tit. 35, §§ 780-101 to-144 (Supp. 1974).
143. Id.
144. TASK FoRCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
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czars, like all successful businessmen, must follow the fundamental
rule of marketing-the commodities and services being offered must
be visible and accessible. Since anything that can be seen or reached by
the consuming public must also be noticeable by law enforcement
authorities, the neutralization of law enforcement is central to organized crime's operations. 45 The Pennsylvania Crime Commission's
report on organized crime candidly described this situation:
It has long been assumed that organized crime exists because it
pays out-right bribes to public officials. But as syndicates have
grown and evolved, they have come to employ more varied and
sophisticated means. They may encourage the promotion of a cooperative official, or they may arrange for him to receive shares of
stock in a business dominated by organized crime. The goal is
nullification of government, whether the means be bribes, more
subtle rewards, or a pervasive fear of vigorously enforcing the law
146

Moreover, the nullification of law enforcement is not as mammoth a
task as it used to be. Centralization of governmental and political
control within communities has made it unnecessary for organized
criminals to bribe large numbers of street-level law enforcement agents.
It is only essential to secure the cooperation of a few of the top-level
147
officials-high ranking police officers, mayors, prosecutors, and judges.
These officials in various ways communicate to their direct subordinates
that certain organized criminal activities are not to be vigorously investigated, at least not without special permission. These middle level
officials then convey the unofficial policies to the street level enforcement agents. 14 Those law enforcement agents who are so bold as to
violate these rules are often denied promotions, and may find themselves transferred from the vice squad to duty as a traffic officer at a
busy intersection. In such situations, those few organized crime operatives who are arrested by obstinate policemen usually can arrange to
have the charges against them dropped, or, at most, receive very mild
sentences. 149 Honest policemen and prosecutors begin to recognize the
futility of their efforts to combat organized crime and consequently
direct their attention elsewhere. The net result is that often honest
145. Id.
146.

REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 9, at 65.

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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law enforcement officers are not willing or able to enforce even the
best organized crime control laws.
The most appropriate response of the new Crimes Code is to increase
the possible punishment for bribery and coercion of public officials.
Under the old Penal Code one who bribed a governmental official in
order to influence his official conduct was guilty of a misdemeanor and
subject to a $500 fine and one year imprisonment; 150 the official who
accepted the bribe was guilty of a felony and subject to a $1000 fine
and 5 years imprisonment.1 51 Furthermore, the old Penal Code outlawed "corrupt solicitation" of public officials by means of bribery or
threats; this offense was a misdemeanor and carried a fine of $1000 and
2 years imprisonment.

52

Chapter 47 of the new Crimes Code is composed of three sections
designed to deal with the problems of bribery and corrupt influence.
Section 4701 punishes the organized crime figure who attempts to influence an official's decision by offering him a pecuniary benefit; it does
not matter whether or not the official accepts the bribe. 53 The statute
public servants and officers of political parties to be
considers all
"officials.' 54 The perpetrator is guilty of a felony of the third degree,
55
and hence is subject to seven years imprisonment and a $15,000 fine.1
Such a penalty is a more severe penalty than the organized crime operative would receive if convicted for engaging in the criminal activity
which he is attempting to protect by his bribery. This is quite rational.
While conducting an illegal lottery is reprehensible, nullifying government is far more serious-it drastically cuts into the quality of justice
and law enforcement in our Commonwealth. Under this new law, the
official who accepts a bribe is equally as guilty and subject to just as
severe penalties as the criminal who bribed him.

56

Such a provision

certainly is appropriate; indeed, because the corrupt official has violated
the public trust, he should receive an even more severe sentence than
his organized crime benefactor.
Section 4702 deals with the situation where a criminal threatens
"unlawful harm" against a government official in order to affect the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, § 303.
Id.
Id. § 304.
CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1973).
Id.
Id. §§ 1101, 1103.
Id. § 4701.
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official's decisions as a public servant, 57 such as his decision to enforce
prostitution or gambling laws. However, the penalties for a violation
of this section are inexplicably mild. A defendant who is found guilty
of committing this offense normally is only guilty of a misdemeanor of
the second degree, which carries a maximum two year jail sentence and
a $5,000 fine. 158 Why should the organized crime figure who used subtle
threats instead of subtle bribes be treated leniently by the law? Sections
4701 and 4702 taken together seem to be telling organized crime that
it is better for them to use threats than bribes to protect their criminal
enterprise. To be sure, section 4702 does further explain that if the
organized crime operative threatened to commit a crime or made a
threat with intent to influence a judicial or administrative proceeding,
the offense is a felony of the third degree, which would carry the same
penalties as bribing an official. 159 However, any organized crime
figure who has established his reputation for being able and willing
to punish those officials who do not follow his wishes would rarely need
to threaten to commit a crime to achieve the nullification of law enforcement; subtle suggestions are usually quite sufficient. 60 This being
the case, the distinction made by section 4702 as to different types of
threats is unrealistic. If the legislature wishes to divide this crime into
categories, provision should be made to treat mild threats by known
racketeers just as severely as explicit threats to commit a crime. A statute
similar to the one discussed above to deal with subtle threats by loan
sharks would be appropriate.
Section 4703 makes it a misdemeanor of the second degree for a
vengeful organized crime figure to harm an official by any unlawful act
in retaliation for anything lawfully done by the latter in his capacity as
a public servant. 6' While this statute is well intended, it probably will
be of little substantive value. The type of retaliation that angry organized criminals who want to "set an example" might use-murder,
assault and battery, arson-would all constitute far more serious crimes
than misdemeanors of the second degree.
Finally, the new Crimes Code acknowledged the fact that corrupt
157. Id. § 4702.
158. Id. §§ 1101, 1103.
159. Id. § 4702. See note 155 supra.
160. This situation is very similar to that presented above with regard to the collection
techniques of loan sharks. One act of violence is often enough to cause many fearful public
officials to quickly agree to carry out requests of organized crime figures. See pp. 824-25
supra.
161. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4703 (1973).
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officials help preserve the monopolistic position of their favored
criminal syndicates over vice activities by harassing the competition
and other uncooperative individuals. 6 2 For example, a merchant who
refuses to give favored status to syndicate-approved "numbers writers"
in his place of business may find himself repeatedly arrested on falsified
charges. A section entitled "official oppression" makes it a misdemeanor
of the second degree if an official knowingly uses his position to violate
the rights of another. 163 This type of conduct is clearly an abuse of
office and certainly should be criminal. One can only criticize the section for the mildness of its penalties.
At this point the sceptic would point out that if our officials are corrupt, there is no one to gather evidence on corruption and prosecute
under these nice new statutes anyway. While this is sometimes unfortunately true in isolated cases, we must have faith in our system and
its ability to produce honest and aggressive policemen and district
attorneys as it always has. Furthermore, when necessary, the Attorney
General of Pennsylvania, as the chief law enforcement officer of the state,
has the power to supercede a local district attorney who is unable or
64
unwilling to fight organized crime and corruption in his county. If
we throw up our hands in frustration and conclude that everyone is
corrupt, it is senseless to discuss any reform in the criminal law at all.
Anyone who has worked with the many dedicated state and local law
enforcement officers who perform their duties throughout Pennsylvania
knows that we are not in such a hopeless predicament.
SUMMARY

t

From the perspective of the organized crime fighter, one can only be
moderately pleased with what the new Crimes Code has to offer. The
new penalties for organized gambling are an improvement, but not significant enough to have much effect on this pivotal activity of organized
162. For a dramatic and comprehensive case study of this phenomenon, see Gardiner,
Wincanton: The Politics of Corruption, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 61.
163.

CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5301 (1973). This section states:

A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking advantage of
such actual or purported capacity commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if,
knowing that his conduct is illegal, he (1) subjects another to arrest, detention, search,
seizure, mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien or other infringment of personal
or property rights, or (2) denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of
any right, privilege, power or immunity.
164. See generally, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 244, 293, 294, 297 (1962). See also Dauphin
County Grand Jury Investigation Proceeding (No. 3), 332 Pa. 358, 2 A.2d 809 (1938);
Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd v. Magiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 A. 524 (1936).
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crime. While a syndicated gambling law would give law enforcement a
powerful tool, the real answer seems to be the legalization of gambling.
The costs of outlawing prostitution are very great both in terms of the
effect on law enforcement authorities and the revenues provided to
organized crime. The legislature has not enacted laws which are truly
designed to inhibit this activity. Unless it is willing to do so, our antiprostitution laws will only protect the criminal's monopoly in providing
this service and continue to contribute to the spread of disease.
In the areas of loan sharking and labor racketeering there is a great
need for sophisticated and strong statutes which the new Crimes Code
does not provide. A model for the kind of comprehensive legislation
that is needed in all these areas is provided by the Corrupt Organizations Act, which does indeed provide a powerful tool for combating the
take-over of businesses by organized crime figures. While we must rely
on the federal authorities to deal with the high levels of the drug syndicates, the new Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act
should enable local law enforcement officials to perform their responsibility of policing this problem on the local level. Since any law is
meaningless unless it is vigorously enforced, the new Crimes Code quite
appropriately awards severe sentences to those officials who would attempt to profit by violating the trust which the public has placed
upon them. Only if the public and legislature are concerned enough
with devastating effects of organized crime to take a realistic approach
to the problem, make the additional needed changes in the laws, and
allocate sufficient manpower and resources to enforce these new statutes, will the battle against the criminal syndicates be a successful
one. In the final analysis, organized crime control laws and their enforcement will only be as effective as the public and the legislature
want them to be.
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